Satellite Power System (SPS) mapping of exclusion areas for rectenna sites

The areas of the United States that were not available as potential sites for receiving antennas that are an integral part of the Satellite Power System concept are presented. Thirty-six variables with the potential to exclude the rectenna were mapped and coded in a computer. Some of these variables exclude a rectenna from locating within the area of its spatial influence, and other variables potentially exclude the rectenna. These maps of variables were assembled from existing data and were mapped on a grid system

Nonstructural Approaches to Flooding and Water Quality Control

Paper by James B. Blackburn, Jr

An Initial Investigation of Structural and Nonstructural Flood Control Alternatives for Cypress Creak, Texas

Paper by Peter G. Rowe, James B. Blackburn, Jr., and Philip B. Bedien

President Reagan's Nuclear Policy from 1981 to 1983: The Effects on National Defense, Foreign Policy, and Society

Relations with the Soviet Union were essential issues to United States foreign and military policy for a large part of the Twentieth Century. The legacies of many American presidents have been determined by their skill in handling this Issue. The Reagan presidency was vital in changing the face of relations with the U.S.S.R. (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). One of the key issues in relations to the Soviet Union was the proper size and focus of United States' nuclear forces. Although Reagan spent eight years in office addressing the issue of his nation's nuclear armaments, the basis of many of his policies to the Soviet Union was formed during his presidential campaign in 1980 and his first three years in office. The conduct of the Carter administration and Reagan�s criticism of it formed another important element in the formation of his nuclear doctrine. Reagan harshly criticized the nuclear policies of his predecessor and their effects on national defense and foreign policy. In the first days of his presidency, Reagan promised to improve the country's position in these manners by increasing the strength of its nuclear defense. In i 983, President Reagan asked the country to allow him another term to pursue his goals for the United States. The nation complied, and Ronald Reagan went on [0 be the dominant voice in United States' military and foreign policy in the decade. One of the most emphasized areas of Reagan�s first term was his nuclear policies. It is important to examine the actual effectiveness of these policies. One needs to examine the question of whether President Reagan fulfilled to the promises made on nuclear policies in his first days in office. The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of President Reagan's nuclear doctrine on United States' defense, its ability to conduct foreign policy, and domestic confidence in safety from nuclear war. The thesis of this work is that despite promises to improve conditions in the nation quickly through a change in nuclear doctrine in a rapid fashion, the first three years of the Reagan administration's nuclear arms doctrine caused a slight decline in United States defense, foreign policy, and public approval compared to the previous administration. Reagan gained considerable support in his presidential campaign by criticizing the nuclear policies and foreign policies of President Carter. After his election, Reagan promised to enhance national security rapidly through a new nuclear program based on modernization of United States' forces. He reasoned improvement on the nation's nuclear forces would put it in a better position to negotiate arms reduction treaties with the Soviet Union, making the United States' doubly protected from nuclear attack. However, the early years of the Reagan administration suffered some of the same problems in its nuclear policy as President Carter had. Public opinion was aligned against the policies of both presidents for much of their terms. Members of Congress and the country's European allies reacted negatively to both nuclear programs and questioned their credibility and feasibility. However, conditions grew worse under Reagan. The United States' European allies became increasingly hostile to the administration's nuclear doctrine because of their fears that the administration was jeopardizing the security of Europe. A portion of the American public expressed its concern through books, films, and rising memberships in nuclear protest groups. Polls indicated the United States' public was increasingly concerned over the threat of nuclear war and believed that Reagan, not the Soviet Union was the chief antagonist. It is important to recognize the limitations of gauging overall public opinion through film, literature, newspaper editorials, and polls. One must realize that the upper class and educated elites in American society, who often held more liberal views than Reagan, enjoyed great influence on the content of film and literature. Public opinion polls can also be misleading because they have the potential manipulated by those who conduct them. This can be done by wording questions in a certain fashion to make one side of an issue seem more attractive. It is also reasonable to conclude that the content of literature and mass media productions do not equally represent portions of American society outside of their producers. While keeping these qualifications in mind, the evidence presented in this work will demonstrate Reagan's nuclear policies spurned a substantial reaction from the elite and liberal portions of the American public, as seen in films, literature, and polls. This work will refer to the terms "public" and "public opinion" with these considerations in mind. Reagan's early nuclear doctrines on national defense, foreign policy, and society have not been specifically or completely addressed in secondary historical literature. Larger works address this issue in fragments or brevity, but none give it comprehensive attention. However, there are various interpretations available on the motivation behind Reagan's overall defense program as well as comparisons of it to the Carter administration. These interpretations partially relate to the topic of this work and deserve attention. The dominant secondary interpretation on the motivation behind Reagan's nuclear buildup is that the administration's program was greatly formulated by conservative advisors of the president. This interpretation holds that Reagan was somewhat dominated by the wishes of his advisors. In The Reagan Doctrine, Mark Lagon argues that the beliefs of conservative advisors played a key role in formulating United States' policy on military issues. This view is also held by Lou Cannon in President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime. Cannon argues Reagan's advisors provided the majority of direction in the administration's plan to modernize the country's nuclear forces. He cited the administration's advocation of the building of the MX Missile as a particular example of this trend. In explaining how the administration justified its buildup, the majority of historians have expressed two arguments. One of these interpretations is the administration claimed that the inadequacies of the Carter administration had dangerously weakened the country. Michael Staak makes this claim in The Reagan Administration: A Reconstruction of American Strength, edited by Helga Haftendom and Jakob Schissler. Staak argues Reagan justified his nuclear buildup by constantly pointing back to the failures of the Carter administration in its dealings with the Soviet Union, the dangers it posed to United States' national security, and the need for a drastic change through an increased emphasis on defense. Others argue that the United States had a moral duty to establish peace through a strong foreign policy and military influence. This view is articulated by Christian Tuchnoff in the Haftendom and Schissler compilation. Tuchnoff argues that Reagan believed in the moral mission of the United States to police the world and applied this belief to his foreign policy. Two conflicting interpretations emerge in historical analyses of the overall military policies of President Reagan compared to those of past administrations. One argument is that Reagan used many of the same methods in dealing with the Soviet Union, following the policy of containment, increasing military readiness, and attempting negotiation to resolve conflict. This view is represented by Louisa Hulett in From Cold Wars to Star Wars. Hulett argues Reagan's policies are particularly similar to those of This work seeks to fill a gap in the secondary literature concerning the specific effects of Reagan's first three years in office on defense, foreign policy, and society. It will address the early years of the presidency and the effectiveness of Reagan's nuclear program. It will also compare the merits of Reagan' nuclear doctrine to the heavily criticized Carter administration. This work will finally seek to refine the conclusions of existing secondary work when applicable to the focus of its study

(FNMR)-F-19 and DFT Analysis Reveal Structural and Electronic Transition State Features for RhoA-Catalyzed GTP Hydrolysis

Molecular details for RhoA/GAP catalysis of the hydrolysis of GTP to GDP are poorly understood. We use 19F NMR chemical shifts in the MgF3− transition state analogue (TSA) complex as a spectroscopic reporter to indicate electron distribution for the γ-PO3− oxygens in the corresponding TS, implying that oxygen coordinated to Mg has the greatest electron density. This was validated by QM calculations giving a picture of the electronic properties of the transition state (TS) for nucleophilic attack of water on the γ-PO3− group based on the structure of a RhoA/GAP-GDP-MgF3− TSA complex. The TS model displays a network of 20 hydrogen bonds, including the GAP Arg85′ side chain, but neither phosphate torsional strain nor general base catalysis is evident. The nucleophilic water occupies a reactive location different from that in multiple ground state complexes, arising from reorientation of the Gln-63 carboxamide by Arg85′ to preclude direct hydrogen bonding from water to the target γ-PO3− group

Congress and Deregulation: Federal Legislative Issues Past, Present and Future.

I am Bill Robinson, and I am pinch-hitting for Mark La Fratta. Mark did something that caused him to have to go to Gary, I am not sure what it is. Perhaps, Mr. Brown will be able to tell us later on. In any event, it is a pleasure to be here. A couple of Saturdays ago, I was out sailing in an old boat I have, and we had wonderful winds. We were wasting in an area on the Rappahannock that I was not very familiar with, and we were just about to make our last tide in the fifth of six legs of the race, when we ran aground so badly, and so far, that it looked like one of those photographs after a hurricane, with the boat keeled over. Eventually, somebody came by and yelled over from his boat, It sure is a lot easier standing up at a podium in a courtroom, than what you are doing, is it not, my boy. It was a bailiff in the Federal Judge\u27s Courtroom in Richmond, and the general proposition he used was correct. And, it is with a little trepidation that I come because you all are experts at this, and the panelists are certainly experts, and I am simply going to be introducing them

From Display to Labelled Proofs for Tense Logics

We introduce an effective translation from proofs in the display calculus to proofs in the labelled calculus in the context of tense logics. We identify the labelled calculus proofs in the image of this translation as those built from labelled sequents whose underlying directed graph possesses certain properties. For the basic normal tense logic Kt, the image is shown to be the set of all proofs in the labelled calculus G3Kt